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The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on 
International Antitrust 
Anu Bradford ,† Adam S. Chilton,†† & Filippo Maria Lancieri‡ 
Beginning in the 1950s, a group of scholars primarily associated with the 
University of Chicago began to challenge many of the fundamental tenants of 
antitrust law. This movement, which became known as the Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis, profoundly altered the course of American antitrust scholarship, 
regulation, and enforcement. What is not known, however, is the degree to which 
Chicago School ideas influenced the antitrust regimes of other countries. By 
leveraging new datasets on antitrust laws and enforcement around the world, we 
empirically explore whether ideas embraced by the Chicago School diffused 
internationally. Our analysis illustrates that many ideas explicitly rejected by the 
Chicago School—such as using antitrust law to promote goals beyond efficiency or 
regulate unilateral conduct—are common features of antitrust regimes in other 
countries. We also provide suggestive evidence that the influence of the antitrust 
revolution launched by the Chicago School has been more limited outside of the 
United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise of law and economics introduced profound changes 
in a wide range of legal fields. In few fields, however, did the 
movement have a more profound effect than in antitrust. The law 
and economics movement led antitrust law and scholarship in the 
United States to become increasingly informed by economic 
theories. Formalistic per se rules that used to characterize US 
antitrust doctrine gave way to a case-by-case assessment of the 
economic effects of firm conduct. As a result, antitrust 
enforcement increasingly began to rely on economic experts, 
theoretical models, and econometrics studies that are now all but 
mandatory in antitrust litigation.1 
This shift in US antitrust policy marked the triumph of ideas 
championed by scholars associated with the University of 
Chicago.2 The “Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”3 (Chicago 
School) used rigorous microeconometric analysis to change 
antitrust enforcers’ focus from economic power to economic 
incentives.4 This new focus, combined with a more conservative 
judiciary, led to a gradual reversal of many previously established 
antitrust doctrines5—from the prosecution of vertical mergers6 to 
the per se treatment of several forms of unilateral conduct.7 
 
 1 See Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for 
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 
54 J Law & Econ 1, 6, 8 (2011) (conducting a survey of 714 antitrust cases in federal and 
administrative courts and finding that, collectively, the cases mentioned the terms “expert 
reports” 332 times, “statistics” 290 times, “expert witnesses” 230 times, and “regression” 
113 times). See also Patrick R. Ward, Comment, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects 
in Antitrust Market Definition, 84 U Chi L Rev 2059, 2070–71 (2017) (commenting on the 
rise of complex economic arguments in market definition). 
 2 See, for example, Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, and Jonathan B. Baker, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts, and Problems in Competition Policy 66–
67 (West 2d ed 2008) (noting how the Chicago School “altered the terms of antitrust 
debate” to include price theory and concepts such as market power, entry, and efficiency). 
 3 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 
925, 925–26 (1979). 
 4 Filippo Maria Lancieri, Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection, and the 
EU/US Transatlantic Rift, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement 27, 33 (2019). 
 5 See id. 
 6 An example of a vertical merger challenge is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294 (1962). In that case, the Court enjoined 
a merger in which the combined vertical market share of both companies did not reach 
10 percent of the national market, and, as evidence of potential anticompetitive harm, the 
Court noted that in 118 cities the combined horizontal market share of companies exceed 
5 percent. Id at 327, 343. See also Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Evaluating 
Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 Antitrust L J 513, 513–14 (1995) 
(discussing how the Chicago School’s critique of Brown Shoe and other challenges to 
vertical mergers led to a more permissive policy). 
 7 See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977); State 
Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 18 (1997); and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, 
Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007) (reversing per se policies that had been in force for decades). 
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Although antitrust scholars may disagree on the appropriateness 
of the Chicago School ideas, few would question the profound 
influence those ideas have had on US antitrust policy. 
An open question remains, however, whether the Chicago 
School has influenced the antitrust policies of other countries. 
Anecdotal examples indicate a complex picture. For instance, 
several countries recognize an efficiency defense—that is, 
justifications used to approve an otherwise anticompetitive 
merger because of the various efficiencies the merger is expected 
to generate—in assessing the competitive effects of mergers.8 This 
practice is very much in line with the Chicago School’s ideas. But 
at the same time, enforcement against unilateral conduct of 
dominant firms remains vigorous in many jurisdictions (at least 
when compared to the United States), including the European 
Union.9 This practice is in tension with the Chicago School view 
that unilateral conduct rarely calls for an antitrust intervention.10 
Moreover, Chicago Scholars also strongly condemned the use of 
antitrust laws for redistributive ends or the promotion of 
industrial policy. For them, it would be disconcerting to learn that 
several countries list the promotion of employment or of national 
industries as a goal of antitrust laws or evaluate mergers based 
on whether they advance the “public interest.” 
In this Essay, we seek to go beyond these anecdotes and 
empirically measure the Chicago School’s international influence. 
To do so, we leverage two recently created datasets on antitrust 
regimes around the world.11 The first—the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset—provides detailed coding on the 
provisions of the antitrust statutes of 131 jurisdictions from their 
first adoption through 2010. The second—the Comparative 
Competition Enforcement Dataset—provides data on the 
enforcement resources and activities of 112 antitrust agencies 
between 1990 and 2010. Together, these datasets provide a 
detailed picture of the world’s antitrust regimes across countries 
and over time. 
 
See also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984) (upholding 
the per se rule against tying, but nonetheless limiting courts’ ability to find such conduct 
illegal in the absence of market power). 
 8 See Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Competition Law Around the World from 
1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index, 14 J Competition L & Econ 393, 410 (2018) 
(noting that as of 2010, at least forty-five countries had an efficiency defense). 
 9 See, for example, Google Search (Shopping), ECComm 1 (AT.39740) (June 27, 
2017) (finding that Google infringed on EU antitrust rules by displaying its own shopping 
service more favorably than competing shopping services in its search results); Antitrust: 
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile 
Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (European Commission, July 
18, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2955-H28S. 
 10 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3). 
 11 See Anu Bradford, et al, Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the 
Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud 411, 
412–13 (2019). See also Bradford and Chilton, 14 J Competition L & Econ at 394–95 (cited 
in note 8). 
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As these data illustrate, since the Chicago School’s antitrust 
revolution, the number of countries with antitrust regimes has 
soared. Figure 1 shows that in 1979, at the end of the period when 
the Chicago School’s most prominent intellectual contributions 
were made,12 just 41 countries had an antitrust regime in place.13 
But by 2010, 127 countries had adopted an antitrust regime.14 
Our data thus allows us to examine whether these 86 antitrust 
regimes that were adopted after the Chicago School’s prominence 
in the US incorporate the insights of the Chicago School into their 
regime, and also whether the countries that already had antitrust 
regimes amended their laws to reflect Chicago School theories. 
FIGURE 1: COUNTRIES WITH ANTITRUST STATUTES, 1900 TO 2010 
 
We specifically use these datasets to examine the influence of 
the Chicago School in three areas. First, we examine the goals 
and exemptions that countries have codified in their antitrust 
statutes. This analysis reveals that many countries have 
explicitly endorsed ideas in their antitrust laws that are 
antithetical to Chicago School theories. For instance, by 2010, 
50 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had explicitly 
codified goals in their antitrust laws unrelated to efficiency—
including the protection of small companies or promotion of 
 
 12 See Part I.A for an explanation of why we designate this window as the height of 
the Chicago School. 
 13 Data on file with authors. 
 14 Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 412 (cited in note 11). 
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exports.15 Second, we examine the provisions of countries’ 
antitrust regimes that regulate unilateral conduct. These data 
reveal that a majority of countries with antitrust regimes 
prohibited several kinds of conduct that Chicago School scholars 
had argued were unlikely to reduce competition. For instance, in 
2010, 63 percent of countries with antitrust regimes prohibited 
unfair pricing. Moreover, in 2010, there were more investigations 
opened around the world into abuses of dominance than into 
cartels. Third, we examine merger review policies globally. Again, 
this analysis illustrates that many countries with merger review 
regimes have laws that incorporate ideas that were rejected by 
the Chicago School. For example, by 2010, 42 percent of countries 
with antitrust regimes had merger defenses unrelated to 
efficiency—including the promotion of general “public interest.” 
That said, from the outset, it is important to acknowledge 
that there are several reasons why the global influence of the 
Chicago School is difficult to quantify.16 First, the Chicago 
School’s ideas are perhaps best understood as a commitment to a 
certain method of antitrust enforcement rather than an 
agreement on specific policy outcomes. This analytical method—
including the general endorsement of an effects-based analysis of 
competitive conduct—may not always have been codified in 
antitrust laws the way a clear rule or policy prescription would 
be, making it difficult to detect. Second, the ideas associated with 
the Chicago School are not always easy to theoretically or 
empirically separate from other schools of thought that endorse 
economic analysis of antitrust laws.17 As a result, our evidence 
may be best understood as capturing the diffusion of economic 
analysis of antitrust laws generally as opposed to the diffusion of 
the Chicago School ideas specifically. Finally, the primary data 
we use to study the influence of the Chicago School are based on 
countries’ antitrust statutes, which do not always reflect how 
laws are enforced in practice. These limitations may lead us to 
either under- or overestimate the extent of Chicago School’s 
global influence. 
Given these limitations, we are unlikely to settle the debate 
on the Chicago School’s contribution to international antitrust. 
But we hope that our results paint a more nuanced view of the 
Chicago School’s thrust than currently exists. Specifically, we 
hope to shed light on whether the Chicago School remained 
largely a US phenomenon, with a limited ability to shape 
antitrust thinking abroad, or whether its ideas diffused more 
broadly. We also hope that our results help enlighten the ongoing 
 
 15 See infra Figure 3.  
 16 Part II.C more extensively discusses the limitations of our approach. 
 17 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 933–44 (cited in note 3) (discussing the convergence 
between the Chicago and Harvard schools of thought). 
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debate on the potential need to reassess antitrust enforcement, 
and the Chicago School, in the United States and beyond. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the 
Chicago School’s main ideas. Part II discusses existing evidence 
on the international influence of the Chicago School and the 
difficulties that arise when trying to empirically measure this 
influence. Part III describes our data and empirical findings. 
I.  THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST 
A. Background 
The so-called Chicago School is the result of decades of 
academic scholarship on antitrust law and policy by professors 
associated with the economics and law departments of the 
University of Chicago. While it is hard to pinpoint an exact 
beginning and end, the Chicago School is said to have started 
forming around the 1950s, reflecting the teaching and influence 
of the University of Chicago law professor Aaron Director and the 
ideas developed by his students and colleagues, including 
Professors George Stigler, Harold Demsetz, Ward Bowman,  John 
McGee, and Lester Telser, and Judges Robert Bork, Richard 
Posner, and Frank Easterbrook.18 More than articulating a 
cohesive theory on antitrust policy, Director instigated his peers 
to use microeconomics and price theory to challenge what were, 
at the time, key antitrust doctrines related to tie-ins, predatory 
pricing, and vertical conduct such as resale price maintenance 
and exclusive dealing.19 The Chicago School advocated that 
scholars and courts should focus on the incentives of economic 
agents and not on the structure of the market to determine the 
competitive effects of mergers and firm conduct.20 This view 
directly challenged the more structuralist approach associated 
with the so-called Harvard School, which was concerned with 
market concentration.21 By doing so, the Chicago School promoted 
a more benign view of corporate conduct, one that warranted less 
antitrust intervention based on a belief that markets would 
largely self-correct while governmental intervention could 
entrench monopolies.22 
 
 18 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 925–26 (cited in note 3); Andrew I. Gavil, et al, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 71 
(West 3d ed 2017). 
 19 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3); Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in 
Perspective at 72 (cited in note 18); A. Douglas Melamed, et al, Antitrust Law and Trade 
Regulation: Cases and Materials 52–53 (Foundation 7th ed 2018). 
 20 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich L Rev 
1696, 1698 (1986). 
 21 See  Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 70–73 (cited in note 18) 
(discussing the shift from a structuralist view to an incentives view). 
 22 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 133 (Basic Books 1978). 
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The Chicago School’s influence peaked in the 1970s and 
1980s.23 The enactment of new federal Merger Guidelines, which 
largely reflected the teachings of Chicago School scholars, 
demonstrated their profound impact on administrative agencies 
tasked with enforcing antitrust laws.24 At the same time, a more 
conservative US judiciary also started to incorporate Chicago 
School ideas into US case law by reverting or qualifying 
important antitrust doctrines, such as those around intrabrand 
vertical restraints or tying.25 
The Chicago School’s influence in the United States started 
to gradually wane around the 1990s and 2000s, at least in 
academia.26 Around that time, other scholars began to combine 
the Chicago School’s own methodological foundations with a more 
in-depth use of game theory to challenge, or at least qualify, some 
of its basic tenets including rationales for market exclusion and 
the Single Monopoly Profit Theorem.27 This criticism of the 
Chicago School ideas gave birth to what some have called the 
post–Chicago School, which combines industrial organization, 
game theory, and empirical tools to measure the extent to which 
firms compete with one another.28 
B. The Chicago School Approach to Antitrust 
The Chicago School approach to antitrust is difficult to 
summarize because there is variation in the ideas embraced by  
 
 23 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75 (cited in note 18). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977); 
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984); Reiter v Sonotone 
Corp, 442 US 330 (1979). Other important cases focused on how to define antitrust harm 
and predatory pricing, and other topics that were also impacted by the work of Harvard 
scholars like Professors Areeda and Turner. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA 
of Modern US Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double 
Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 46–47. These scholars warned of the dangers of 
overenforcement of antitrust laws by private litigators. See id at 51–54. See also 
Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 487 (1977); Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 221–25, 227, 232–33, 238–39 (1993). 
 26 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75–77 (cited in note 18) (cited in 
note 2) (discussing the rise of the “post-Chicago” school). The Chicago School still had 
important wins in the judiciary, such as the cases around resale price maintenance. See 
State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 18 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, 
Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007). 
 27 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L J 209, 225–27 (1986); Einer 
Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
123 Harv L Rev 397, 400 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle 
and Execution 38–39 (Harvard 2008). 
 28 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich L Rev 213, 260–
64 (1985) (discussing how the Chicago School models did not consider appropriately real-
world problems and ignored many forms of strategic behavior). See also Gavil, et al, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective at 76 (cited in note 18). For a review on the problems of these 
“School” divisions, see Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 72–80 (cited in note 25). 
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scholars associated with the School.29 To simplify, we briefly 
explain the basic arguments of Judges Robert Bork and Richard 
Posner in three of their seminal works: Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, 
Posner’s Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, and Posner’s 
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.30 We choose to focus on 
the works of Bork and Posner not only because of their prominent 
role as judges who applied the Chicago School teachings to 
concrete antitrust cases, but also because of their tendency to 
articulate largely similar and comprehensive views on how the 
Chicago School should impact antitrust policy.31 
According to the Chicago School, the main goal of antitrust 
was the promotion of consumer welfare, which Judge Bork 
understood as general or total welfare.32 The Chicago School 
ignored “small-business welfare”33 and the protection of 
competition for competition’s sake.34 For instance, it decried the 
Robinson-Patman Act35 as an example of small-business antitrust 
that represented unsound redistributive antitrust policy.36 More 
broadly, antitrust policy should not concern itself with 
redistributing surplus between consumers and firms or among 
different firms. This type of redistribution is better left for private 
bargaining, markets, and Congress.37 Nor should antitrust policy 
be deployed for the pursuit of industrial policy. 
For Chicago School scholars, price theory is the proper lens 
to study the competitive behavior of firms.38 Courts should not 
infer market power from market shares (save at very high 
concentration levels), and should demonstrate the existence of 
market power and consumer harm in order to justify an antitrust 
intervention. Judge Bork in particular was against “incipiency” 
 
 29 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3). See also Einer Elhauge, Harvard, 
Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent US Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 
Competition Pol Intl 59, 71–72 (2007) (distinguishing “Judge Posner’s Chicago School 
view” from “Judge Easterbrook’s Chicago School position”); Bruce H. Kobayashi and 
Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 
78 Antitrust L J 147, 154 (2012) (discussing the “many disagreements regarding the 
appropriate scope of policy among Chicago School scholars”). 
 30  See generally Bork, Antitrust Paradox (cited in note 22); Richard A. Posner, 
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago 1976); Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev (cited in 
note 3). 
 31 It is important to acknowledge that Judges Bork and Posner did disagree on 
important topics, such as how to characterize predatory pricing or the dangers of parallel 
conduct. See note 101 and accompanying text. 
 32 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 7 (cited in note 22) (“[T]he only legitimate goal of 
antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”). 
 33 Id at 17, 51. 
 34 See id at 58–61. 
 35 49 Stat 1526 (1936), codified as amended in various sections of Title 15. 
 36 See id at 64, 386. 
 37 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 55–56 (cited in note 22). Bork specifically rejects 
granting judges the power to define trade-offs in terms of winners or losers of economic 
surplus. Id at 80 (“Striking the balance is essentially a legislative task.”). 
 38 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
117 (cited in note 22). 
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theories—that is, the proposition that courts are able to identify 
anticompetitive conduct before it takes place.39 The Chicago view 
was that false positives are costlier than false negatives because 
the market has strong incentives to self-correct, while speculative 
government intervention may lead to consumer harm and a waste 
of taxpayer money.40 
This enforcement philosophy led the Chicago School to 
advocate a minimalist antitrust policy that focuses on egregious 
competitive restraints that have no efficiency justification.41 The 
goal was to fight deadweight loss: in particular, output 
restrictions that raise consumer prices in an artificial manner.42 
Antitrust enforcement should therefore focus on dismantling 
cartels and preventing large horizontal mergers (that is, mergers 
between competitors) that lead to inefficient monopolies or 
facilitate collusion.43 The Chicago School also warned against 
using the intent to exclude competitors as a proxy for a 
competition violation, as all businesses have the intent to exclude 
their rivals,44 and argued that consumers would typically benefit 
from the exclusion of inefficient rivals.45 
The Chicago School’s antitrust minimalism was supported by 
the School’s resounding faith in efficient business conduct and 
self-correcting markets. The Chicago School promoted the view 
that most corporate conduct was efficient, further justifying the 
narrow scope for government intervention. This view 
subsequently translated into an expanded use of the efficiency 
defense for all forms of mergers and unilateral conduct.46 
Similarly, the Chicago School emphasized the ability of new 
entrants to discipline most types of anticompetitive behavior. It 
thereby attacked an expansive view of barriers to entry in 
markets, arguing that such barriers are less common than 
conventionally envisioned.47 
 
 39 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 17, 48 (cited in note 22). 
 40 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox 
at 133 (cited in note 22). 
 41 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 133 (cited in note 22). 
 42 See id at 35, 122–23. 
 43 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928, 933 (cited in note 3). 
 44 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 39 (cited in note 22). 
 45 See id at 56. 
 46 See id at 19, 25–26, 88, 111. Here some clarification is needed. Antitrust initially 
included efficiency defenses, but the Brandeis Supreme Court movement largely set them 
aside. In addition, Judge Bork was initially against an efficiency defense in mergers as 
proposed in Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18, 33 (1968), arguing that courts would not be able to properly 
measure it. See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 111–12 (cited in note 22). For him, efficiency 
should be largely presumed as a result of mergers. See id. Nonetheless, we believe that 
Chicago School scholars were largely responsible for bringing discussions on the efficiency 
of mergers back to antitrust policy, similarly to what they have done to discussions around 
efficiency in many other areas. 
 47 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 310–29 (cited in note 22). In particular, the 
Chicago School argued that economies of scale, product differentiation, expenditures on 
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The presumption that mergers generally lead to efficiencies 
lent support for a narrow merger regime limited to reviewing 
large, horizontal mergers.48 The Chicago School was not 
concerned about simple increases in market shares (save at very 
high concentration levels).49 It also criticized American courts for 
neglecting this efficiency justification, in particular the Supreme 
Court’s Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States50 and United States 
v Von’s Grocery Co51 decisions.52 The Chicago School scholars 
defended vertical mergers as generally efficient, asserting that 
they rarely lead to foreclosure concerns.53 Similarly, conglomerate 
mergers were seen as typically efficient, warranting little 
antitrust intervention.54 
Chicago School scholars further believed that firms cannot 
generally obtain or enhance monopoly power through unilateral 
action. This is because, in most cases, firms would just preserve 
or gain market share at the expense of profits.55 In addition, 
antitrust law should not be concerned with attacking companies 
in monopolized or oligopolized industries when their size has been 
achieved by internal growth, as larger firms are normally more 
efficient than smaller ones.56 As previously noted, they also 
viewed oligopolies as largely competitive.57 Judge Bork goes as far 
as to say that exclusionary conduct by dominant firms is a class 
of illegal behavior that does not exist.58 For example, predatory 
pricing is generally procompetitive, as subsequent attempts to 
recoup losses from below-cost pricing will inevitably face new 
entry that erodes monopoly profits. Even if strategic behavior in 
specific circumstances could lead to predatory pricing, the high 
administrative costs of separating legitimate discounts from 
predatory pricing should prevent authorities from focusing 
enforcement on such conduct.59 Given the Chicago School’s 
 
advertising and promotion, rebates, and dealership deals and capital requirements in 
general do not constitute entry barriers. See id. 
 48 See id at 221, 231 (arguing that “[horizontal] mergers up to 60 or 70 percent of the 
market should be permitted” and that “there is no reason for the law to oppose [vertical] 
mergers”). 
 49 See id at 180–81. That is because many oligopolies were seen as actually 
competitive. 
 50 370 US 294 (1962). 
 51 384 US 270 (1966). 
 52 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 198–204 (cited in note 22) (attacking the decisions 
in Brown Shoe Co and Von’s Grocery Co). 
 53 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 227 (cited in note 22). Cases in which products are 
not consumed in fixed proportions may be exceptions, but even in those cases vertical 
mergers may increase efficiency by enabling price discrimination. 
 54 See id at 246. Conglomerate mergers are defined as any merger that is neither 
horizontal (fear of coordination) nor vertical (fear of foreclosure). 
 55 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3). 
 56 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 164, 178 (cited in note 22). 
 57 See id at 103–04, 180–81. 
 58 See id at 171. 
 59 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 939–40 (cited in note 3). 
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benevolent view of unilateral conduct, it resisted the idea of 
breaking up monopolies.60 
The Chicago School also viewed many other competition 
restrictions as efficiency enhancing. For example, intrabrand 
restraints were seen as generally procompetitive given their 
tendency to spur interbrand competition.61 Similarly, price 
discrimination allowed the monopolist to serve additional 
consumers and mitigate deadweight loss.62 The Chicago School 
also emphasized the efficiencies associated with maximum and 
minimum resale price maintenance,63 exclusive dealing and long-
term contracts,64 territorial restraints,65 conditional discounts,66 
and tying.67 
II.  THE GLOBAL INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
As the above discussion illustrates, the Chicago School 
advocated a much smaller role for antitrust enforcement than 
what existed at the time in the United States.68 But beyond the 
acknowledgement of the gradual adoption of antitrust law and 
economics in the EU and a few other jurisdictions, there has been 
limited scholarship on the whether the Chicago School’s more 
minimalist approach—or what Judge Easterbrook called 
“workable” antitrust policy69—disseminated outside of America. 
In this Part, we first discuss what is known about the ways 
Chicago School ideas—and law and economics more generally—
have shaped antitrust policies around the world. We then explain 
why the specific ideas associated with the Chicago School seem to 
have gained limited traction. Finally, we address the difficulty of 
empirically testing the extent of the Chicago School’s influence. 
 
 60 See id at 944–45; Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 178 (cited in note 22). The reason for 
opposing breakups as a remedy was twofold: either competition is feasible, in which case 
new entrants are more efficient than governments in transforming uncompetitive 
oligopolies into competitive markets; or markets are simply not competitive (for example, 
natural monopolies), in which case breaking up firms would lead to a loss of scale and 
inefficiencies. Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 944–45 (cited in note 3). 
 61 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 156–57 (cited in note 22). Interventions in these 
cases should be restricted to the few cases in which the market shares of the company 
involved are very high (approximately 80–90 percent) and there is proof of intent to harm 
competition. Id at 157. 
 62 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
240 (cited in note 22). 
 63 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
280–81 (cited in note 22). 
 64 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
309 (cited in note 22). 
 65 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
297–98 (cited in note 22). 
 66 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 326 (cited in note 22). 
 67 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
375 (cited in note 22). 
 68 See Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 17–18, 21–22 (cited in note 25). 
 69 Easterbrook, 84 Mich L Rev at 1700–01 (cited in note 20). 
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A. What We Know About the Influence of the Chicago School 
While a significant body of scholarship discusses the 
influence of the Chicago School on US antitrust law, we are 
unaware of any notable literature examining the influence of the 
Chicago School across the world. The existing scholarship 
recognizes the international influence of the law and economics 
movement in general, but it pays little attention to the role of the 
Chicago School in particular. While this literature suggests that 
law and economics has gained some traction outside the US, the 
influence of the Chicago School seems more tentative.70 Some 
commentators even suggest that outside the US, “the Chicago 
model has in general been studied more for its pitfalls than for its 
accuracy and appropriateness.”71 But the Chicago School ideas 
may have diffused selectively as part of some foreign jurisdictions’ 
willingness to embrace principles associated with law and 
economics. 
In particular, over the last two decades, the law and 
economics movement has become more influential in some parts 
of the world, even though foreign jurisdictions have embraced it 
more selectively and deployed its ideas with more caveats 
compared to the US.72 As a result, a growing number of antitrust 
jurisdictions “are creating, analyzing, and enforcing law with an 
eye toward its economic consequences, usually defined in terms 
of allocative efficiency.”73 For instance, the Small but Significant 
and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test—an economic 
test used to identify the smallest relevant market within which a 
monopolist could profitably impose a significant increase in 
price—is now the most commonly used method for market 
definition across jurisdictions.74 
The evolution of EU antitrust law illustrates the growing 
influence of law and economics outside the United States. As of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has increasingly embraced 
economic analysis of antitrust law, including some aspects of the 
Chicago School.75 The goal of EU antitrust law has increasingly 
 
 70 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 Cardozo L Rev 367, 
401 (2009). 
 71 Mel Marquis, Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust, 28 Pac 
McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 155, 203 (2015). 
 72 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 401 (cited in note 70). 
 73 Id at 368. 
 74 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of 
Economic Analysis in Competition Cases *8 (Apr 28, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
YX8M-C6VN. 
 75 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics 
Movement in Europe, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 5 (1997) (discussing the “rapid growth of 
the [law and economics] field in Europe”); Wolfgang Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 
EC in Light of the “Economic Approach”, in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde 
Gallego, and Stefan Enchelmaier, eds, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, 
New Enforcement Mechanisms? 1, 1–2 (Springer 2008) (noting that since the late 1990s, 
the European Commission’s attempts to modernize EC competition law have been focused 
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centered on consumer welfare:76 the broader goals that 
characterized the earlier decades of EU’s antirust policy are no 
longer key drivers of EU enforcement, even if some, such as 
market integration, remain important.77 Various European 
Commission enforcement guidelines similarly emphasize the 
effects-based analysis and the central role of the efficiency 
defense.78 On mergers, the European Commission’s approach is 
similar to the United States’.79 On unilateral conduct, the 
Commission has abandoned its prior, overly formalistic analysis 
in favor of a more effects-based analysis of anticompetitive 
behavior—even if the Commission continues to be criticized for 
falling short of the economic analysis endorsed in its own Article 
102 guidelines, or deeming (almost) per se illegal certain types of 
conduct that are (almost) per se legal in the United States.80 
As evidence of this general shift toward greater acceptance of 
economic analysis of EU antitrust law, the former Director 
General of Competition for the European Commission, Philip 
Lowe, argued in a 2003 speech for the need for a “comprehensive 
reassessment of practice under Article [102] in the light of 
economic thinking [because] [a] credible policy on abusive conduct 
must be compatible with mainstream economics.”81 Suggesting 
that the EU had learned from US doctrine, Lowe emphasized the 
need to focus on “economic analysis” and apply economic theory 
to existing case law.82 The shift in tone took place in merger 
review after the European Commission experienced a string of 
humiliating defeats before the European Court of Justice, which 
in 2002 overturned three of the Commission’s merger prohibitions 
at the appeal stage in a close sequence, strongly criticizing the 
 
on “an increased role of economics in competition law,” with “strong emphasis [ ] placed on 
the promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare”). 
 76 See Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 
TFEU 6 (Hart 2d ed 2013) (“[I]t is more than tolerably clear that consumer welfare is now 
the primary objective of EU competition law”). The interpretation of consumer welfare in 
the EU diverges from the United States in important ways, in particular given the 
requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. See Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, 
and Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era *40 (EU 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8K4J-Q6BB. 
 77 See Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC at *17 (cited in note 75) (noting that 
an EU approach to competition law “places welfare considerations next to the traditional 
objectives, such as market integration”). 
 78 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 79–80, 225–26 (cited in note 
76). 
 79 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 398 (cited in note 70). 
 80 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 270 (cited in note 76); Alison 
Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 365 (Oxford 
6th ed 2016) (discussing the EU application of effects analysis in unilateral conduct). For 
a brief EU/US analysis, see Lancieri, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement at 34–36 (cited in note 4). 
 81 Philip Lowe, Speech Delivered by Philip Lowe at the Fordham Antitrust 
Conference in Washington *2 (Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Oct 23, 2003), archived 
at https://perma.cc/B3KN-LGZB. 
 82 Id at *3, 7. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502987
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435097 
 14 
Commission’s inadequate economic assessment.83 This criticism 
prompted the Commission to reassess its antitrust policy, and 
contributed to its greater willingness to embrace economic 
analysis as a cornerstone of the EU’s antitrust enforcement. A 
2009 study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) also documents the shift in EU 
antitrust policy, citing the recent reforms in EU antitrust law 
“from a form-based towards a more effects-based approach [as] an 
example of greater reliance on economic analysis.”84 In particular, 
the UNCTAD emphasizes the EU’s adoption of the SSNIP test for 
defining relevant markets in 1997, the revision of its rules on 
vertical and horizontal restraints in 1999 and 2000, and its 
revised merger regulations in 2004 and 2007.85 
Despite these developments, many key elements of EU 
antitrust law that are contrary to Chicago School principles have 
remained intact. For example, the EU continues to challenge 
vertical and conglomerate mergers contrary to the Chicago 
School’s teachings that emphasize these types of mergers’ pro-
competitive effects.86 In a similarly stark departure from the 
Chicago School ideas, vertical agreements that contain territorial 
restrictions or restrict the resale price of goods or services often 
lead to per se antitrust liability in the EU.87 Additionally, the EU 
treats exclusionary conduct by dominant firms with suspicion and 
actively pursues these firms’ tying, discounting, exclusive 
dealing, as well as predatory, discriminatory, or unfair pricing 
practices.88 By continuing to subject such a broad range of conduct 
to antitrust scrutiny, the EU shows it has not relinquished its 
rather “maximalist” approach to antitrust, which is antithetical 
to the Chicago School’s antitrust minimalism. 
Some scholars have suggested that the way law professors 
and students are trained explains why law and economics takes 
hold in certain places. For example, Professor Spencer Weber 
Waller argues that law and economics became more influential in 
the EU as increasing “direct study and personal, professional, and 
academic contacts between the U.S. and E.U. competition 
communities . . . inevitably expose[d] E.U. decision-makers to 
Chicago School jurisprudence.”89 Similarly, in Japan, law and 
economics became more prominent as young Japanese faculty 
 
 83 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 397–98 (cited in note 70). 
 84 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of 
Economic Analysis at *3 (cited in note 74). 
 85 See id at *3 n 3. 
 86 See Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 436 (cited in note 11). 
 87 See Ioannis Apostolakis, Resale Price Maintenance and Absolute Territorial 
Protection: Single Market Integration, the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine and the 
Application of Article 101 TFEU to Vertical Agreements, 38 World Competition 215, 215–
17 (2015); Bhawna Gulati, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Agreements: Economic & 
Commercial Justifications, 9 Manchester J Intl Econ L 92, 95 (2012). 
 88 Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 395 & nn 97–98 (cited in note 70). 
 89 Id at 397. 
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were increasingly completing at least part of their training in the 
United States.90 One empirical study attributed the popularity of 
law and economics in some countries, but not others, to different 
structural incentives in each academic community: in countries 
such as Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States, writing 
law and economics papers is viewed as more valuable when 
considering academic appointments and promotions, leading to 
greater influence of law and economics there in comparison to 
countries like Germany.91 
Frequent interactions among antitrust enforcers have also 
contributed to the dissemination of economic theories. The US 
and the EU antitrust agencies have concluded several bilateral 
cooperation agreements with their foreign counterparts.92 These 
formalized channels of interaction, together with cooperation on 
technical assistance and training, have enabled greater diffusion 
of basic economic theories underlying antitrust enforcement in 
the United States and the EU.93 The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International 
Competition Network have also provided important settings for 
voluntary cooperation and diffusion of best practices, including 
economic analysis of antitrust law. However, these networks have 
not fully embraced the Chicago School’s vision of antitrust law. 
Instead, they have endorsed a more expansive notion of antitrust 
enforcement while emphasizing the benefits of economic 
principles as a foundation of sound antitrust policy. 
B. Why the Chicago School’s International Influence May Be 
Limited 
The growing popularity of law and economics in some 
jurisdictions begs the question why the Chicago School has had a 
more limited international influence. One explanation is that the 
Chicago School never intended to have a global reach. Its creators 
and promoters were primarily focused on transforming American 
antitrust doctrine and lacked any self-conscious objective to 
spread its teachings abroad. Yet the absence of a “missionary 
agenda” likely also reflects the thin international antitrust 
landscape at the height of the Chicago School’s influence. Only 
forty-one jurisdictions had adopted an antitrust law by 1979.94 
Few likely predicted in the early 1970s that the world in 2019 
 
 90 See Shozo Ota, Law and Economics in Japan: Hatching Stage, 11 Intl Rev L & 
Econ 301, 302 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics in Japan, 2011 Ill L Rev 
1455, 1461. 
 91 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of “Law & Economics”, 35 Cap U L Rev 
787, 797–803 (2007). 
 92 See Marquis, 28 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 176 (cited in note 71). 
 93 See id at 177 (noting that the first general bilateral agreements “enabled agencies 
to build a communicative infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, develop trust, 
and exchange expertise”). 
 94 Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 417 (cited in note 11). 
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would have over 130 jurisdictions with a domestic antitrust law 
or saw the extent to which the conduct of US corporations would 
be constrained by EU and other foreign antitrust regulators.95 
Thus, there was no perceived need to internationalize the Chicago 
School ideas at the time. 
More recently, there has been a growing understanding in 
the United States of the globalization of antitrust law, which has 
led to a more concerted effort to export US-style antitrust laws 
and economics abroad. However, by the time the significant 
internationalization of antitrust law had become clear, the more 
coherent ideas of the Chicago School had given way to a more 
diffuse set of economic ideologies, shaped by multiple different 
schools of thought. Thus, when the DOJ and the FTC began to 
engage with their foreign counterparts in earnest in the late 
1990s, their “export product” was a more diluted version of the 
Chicago School. In other words, the economic principles they 
endorsed no longer followed the pure tenants of Chicago School 
ideas, and they instead embraced variations of Harvard School 
and post–Chicago School economics that had since become 
mainstream in US antitrust thinking. 
Relatedly, what may also have compromised the direct 
influence of the Chicago School ideas is the lack of a scholarly 
consensus over which facets of US antitrust law were actually 
influenced by them, as opposed to a hybrid Chicago-Harvard or 
post-Chicago ideas. If this was not clear in the United States, it 
was likely even less clear for any foreign jurisdiction looking to 
import ideas from abroad. Any country seeking to emulate US 
antitrust policies hence was less likely to make the distinction 
among these variants of economic thinking, adopting some 
elements of each as opposed to any pure variant of the Chicago 
School. Further, even those elements were more likely adopted to 
fit the local needs and circumstances, further blending the 
theories that came to guide the various domestic antitrust laws. 
What may have further compromised the global diffusion of 
Chicago School ideas is that by the time most foreign jurisdictions 
adopted an antitrust law, they had an alternative antitrust model 
to follow and often preferred to turn to the EU antitrust laws 
instead. While the United States has attempted to promote the 
“development of sound antitrust laws” abroad,96 historically, the 
EU system has had more direct influence on countries seeking to 
implement competition policies for the first time.97 There are 
several reasons for this, including that the EU actively promotes 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Wendell L. Willkie II, Antitrust Goes International, 59 Antitrust L J 563, 563 
(1991). 
 97 Anu Bradford, et al, The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over 
American Antitrust Law, J Empirical Legal Stud *12, 16 (forthcoming), archived at 
https://perma.cc/NJ76-GG87 (examining 126 countries’ first competition law adopted and 
finding that more countries have implemented laws similar to the EU than to the US). 
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its model through preferential trade agreements and has an 
administrative template that is easy to emulate due to its relative 
statutory precision.98 Former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic 
suggests that unlike the EU, the United States does not have the 
consolidated bargaining power to induce potential trade partners 
into adopting its antitrust models; it instead must persuade those 
jurisdictions that its experience and theories are superior.99 The 
United States’ attempts to emphasize the superiority of its policy, 
however, have rarely been successful. Indeed, we show elsewhere 
how the EU’s antitrust model eclipsed that of the US in the 1990s 
as the template for new antitrust jurisdictions.100 
However, the EU’s gradual adoption of economic analysis, in 
turn, may have contributed to the diffusion of the law and 
economics movement around the world. Thus, the United States’ 
ideas of antitrust law and economics have most successfully 
diffused only once the EU started to embrace and promote them 
as part of its own legal regime. Yet the EU never embraced a 
strong version of the Chicago School and has been hesitant to 
spread many of its principles. This partially explains why the 
variant of law and economics that has gained traction abroad is 
the variant embraced by the EU. As we show in the next Part, 
many jurisdictions around the world continue to follow the EU’s 
lead in prohibiting a broad range of anticompetitive conduct by a 
monopolist and restricting many types of vertical agreements 
that the Chicago School considered per se procompetitive. 
However, by recognizing efficiency defenses and enforcing their 
laws against the benchmarks of consumer welfare or efficiency, 
these jurisdictions also acknowledge the broader contours of law 
and economics as key to their antitrust policies. 
Even though the Chicago School’s international influence 
may be limited in practice, an argument could be made that the 
Chicago School’s philosophy would have served many foreign 
jurisdictions well. The Chicago School’s minimalist doctrine could 
well have been simpler for many jurisdictions to follow compared 
to the more nuanced analytical models associated with post–
 
 98 Id at *23, 28. See also William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future 
Influence on Global Competition Policy, 22 Geo Mason L Rev 1157, 1157 (2015) 
(suggesting that “the compatibility of the EU’s antitrust institutions with civil law states 
that were new adopters of competition law contributed to its increased influence”); Dina I. 
Waked, Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges, 12 
J L Econ & Pol 193, 202 (2016) (noting that “the EU has been extremely active in the 
process of spreading its competition law to developing countries. . . . to the extent where 
some argue that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law 
in the world”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 99 See Kovacic, 22 Geo Mason L Rev at 1159–60 (cited in note 98). See also Marquis, 
28 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at  181–82 (cited in note 71) (suggesting that 
“unlike the EU, the U.S. may not hold a comparable trump card strong enough to insist 
on an isomorphic remodeling of its trade partner’s substantive arrangements in the field 
of competition law”). 
 100 Bradford, et al, J Empirical Legal Stud at *16 (cited in note 97). 
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Chicago School. This may be true in particular for countries with 
few resources and hence the ability to engage only in selective 
antirust interventions. The inadequate economics training of 
many agencies and judges in some countries may make it difficult 
for those jurisdictions to pursue conduct when pro- and 
anticompetitive effects are difficult to separate. For example, 
unilateral conduct, vertical agreements, and vertical mergers are 
difficult to investigate as they often present complex trade-offs 
between pro- and anticompetitive effects. The narrow focus on 
hard-core cartels or horizontal mergers could therefore have 
presented a legitimate enforcement agenda that would have been 
more feasible to carry out. 
Despite the advantage of the Chicago School’s narrow 
enforcement agenda, some jurisdictions may not have had the 
domestic support for the strong promarket ideology that was 
associated with the Chicago School. For instance, the markets in 
some developing countries were less robust and more prone to 
failure, inviting an antitrust agenda that was broader and more 
interventionist. Also, public support for the pursuit of unilateral 
conduct by monopolies was high in many of the jurisdictions, in 
particular in economies where the state still controls many large 
enterprises or where privatization has merely shifted the 
ownership of large conglomerates from public to private hands. 
There was thus no fertile political economy ground for the 
Chicago School ideas in their pure forms to take hold. 
C. Why the Chicago School Influence Is Difficult to Test 
Testing the international influence of the Chicago School 
empirically is difficult, which likely explains the few attempts to 
do so to date. As mentioned in the introduction, our own attempt 
to do so faces three important limitations: (1) the Chicago School 
is a commitment to analytical methods rather than specific 
statutory provisions or policy outcomes; (2) the the Chicago 
School’s propositions are intertwined with the broader growth of 
the law and economics movement; and (3) our database reflects 
mostly antitrust statutes around the world, which may fail to 
capture subtleness in policy changes. While we do our best in this 
Essay to overcome these limitations, we readily acknowledge the 
limitations to our analyses. 
First, as we explained in Part I.B, the Chicago School was 
more of a commitment to deploy certain methods, like price 
theory, to understand firm behavior than it was a specific 
substantive philosophy. This means that even Chicago School 
scholars disagreed on policy outcomes.101 This creates two 
 
 101 For example, Judges Bork and Posner disagreed on how to treat predation claims, 
with Bork advocating an almost per se legality to predation and Posner affirming that it 
can be damaging in specific circumstances. Compare Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 154 (cited 
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challenges: first, it allows us to, in theory, pick the most favorable 
results to our analysis and then justify them on some variation of 
the Chicago School; and second, the Chicago School methods 
normally lead to most forms of firm behavior being evaluated 
under the rule of reason—a process not always reflected in formal 
rules that form the core of our database. 
Second, some of the ideas associated with the Chicago School 
are somewhat intertwined with a more general use of economic 
analysis of law. This is a limitation that we cannot effectively 
address. Therefore, the results below, to the extent they indicate 
a spread of the Chicago School, can be interpreted more broadly 
to capture the diffusion of economic analysis of antitrust laws 
generally as opposed to specific diffusion of the Chicago School’s 
ideas—although the Chicago School was a key driver behind the 
emergence and evolution of economic analysis of antitrust. 
Third, the data we deploy to study the Chicago School’s 
influence consists of comprehensive coding of the world’s 
antitrust statutes and selected aggregate information on 
enforcement actions taken by antitrust authorities around the 
world. To the extent that these laws and cases do not reflect the 
actual enforcement practice of a given country, our results may 
underestimate or overestimate the extent of the Chicago School’s 
global influence.102 
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
We are not aware of previous attempts to study empirically 
the international influence of the Chicago School. The goal of this 
study is therefore to explore the international influence of the 
Chicago School with the help of novel data. We first briefly 
introduce our data on antitrust laws and enforcement around the 
world. We then examine whether countries’ antitrust regimes are 
consistent with Chicago School ideas in three ways: (1) the goals 
and exemptions they explicitly incorporate into their antitrust 
laws, (2) their regulation of unilateral conduct, and (3) their 
provisions on the review of mergers. 
A. Data 
In order to test the international influence of the Chicago 
School, we use data that we recently collected as part of the 
 
in note 22) (concluding that “[i]t seems unwise” to create predatory pricing rules, because 
predation likely does not exist or exists only in rare cases), with Posner, Antitrust Law at 
187 (cited in note 30) (arguing that predatory pricing should not be freely permitted and 
noting the “social costs” of predation). See also generally Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust 
and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, 10 Cato J 775 (1991). 
 102 An example is the Robinson-Patman Act in the United States, which is still on the 
books but rarely enforced by courts. See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 
Geo Wash L Rev 2064, 2080 (2015). Our database would indicate that this law is against 
the teachings of the Chicago School, while actual enforcement data would say otherwise. 
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Comparative Competition Law Project.103 We specifically draw 
from two distinct datasets. Although these datasets both have 
limitations, we believe they provide the most comprehensive 
picture currently available of antitrust regimes around the world. 
To provide a sense of their scope, Figure 2 shows the countries 
that are included in at least one of the datasets. 
FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES IN THE COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 
AND ENFORCEMENT DATASETS 
 
First, our data on antitrust laws is from the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset.104 This dataset was constructed over a 
period of six years by employing a team of over seventy Columbia 
Law School students with relevant legal training and language 
skills.105 To construct the dataset, we first identified all the 
antitrust statues, relevant sector-specific regulations, and other 
laws that contained provisions related to regulating market 
competition that any jurisdiction with an antirust regime had 
passed at any time prior to 2010. For each law, we had two coders 
complete a 171-part survey that documented relevant elements of 
the jurisdictions’ antitrust regime, including whether it, for 
example, prohibits resale price maintenance, provides for 
criminal sanctions or recognizes a public interest defense in 
merger reviews. We then had a third, more experienced, coder 
review discrepancies and create a final consensus coding for every 
antitrust provision. In total, we coded 700 laws for 131 
jurisdictions, including 126 countries and 5 regional 
organizations.106 
 
 103 See generally Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud (cited in note 11). 
 104 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 415–24 (cited in note 11). 
 105 Id at 416. 
 106 Id at 417. There are four jurisdictions that we are aware of having an antitrust 
regime prior to 2010 for which we were unable to code: ASEAN, Djibouti, the Faroe 
Islands, and Iran. Id at 413 n 4. 
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These data focus on the antitrust laws codified in statutes. 
This may seem like a significant limitation from the US 
perspective as courts play a major role in the development of 
antitrust law in the US. However, this is not the case in most 
countries.107 To confirm this, we conducted an expert survey of 
antitrust experts from around the world that asked about the role 
that courts play in the development of antitrust law.108 In total, 
166 experts from 86 countries completed our survey. Of those 
countries, the experts responded that courts play a large or 
extensive role in the development of antitrust law in just twelve 
countries.109 As a result, for most countries, our coding of 
countries’ antitrust laws on the books should accurately capture 
the content of their antitrust regimes. 
Second, our data on antitrust enforcement is from the 
Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset.110 This dataset 
was constructed over a period of five years by employing a team 
of over forty Columbia Law School and University of Chicago Law 
School students that also had relevant legal training and 
language skills. To construct this dataset, we identified 
jurisdictions with an antitrust agency in place any time between 
1990 and 2010. We collected publicly available information on 
variables such as the agencies’ resources (for example, staff and 
budget), investigations opened, and investigations closed with 
remedies. After reviewing all publicly available information for 
each agency, we then created specifically tailored questionnaires 
that we sent directly to each agency to ask for more information 
on their enforcement activities. Through this process, 103 
agencies provided us with at least some data and, in total, we 
were able to collect at least some data from 112 agencies across 
100 jurisdictions.111 
B. Goals and Exemptions 
We begin by exploring the goals that countries explicitly state 
in their antitrust statutes. As previously noted, the Chicago 
School emphasizes that the appropriate goals of antitrust policy 
are related to efficiency. But instead of following Chicago School 
teachings and stipulating that the goals of their antitrust regime 
are simply efficiency, consumer welfare, or total welfare 
(“Efficiency-Related Goals”), some countries explicitly articulate 
 
 107 See id at 419. 
 108 For more information on the survey, see Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Trade 
Openness and Antitrust Law, 62 J L & Econ 29, 48–49 (2019). 
 109 Id. The twelve countries that received an average score of 4 or higher are: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States. Id at 49 n 15. 
 110 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 424–37 (cited in note 11). 
 111 Id at 425–26. 
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goals aimed at broader industrial or social policy (“Non-
Efficiency-Related Goals”). 
FIGURE 3: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY-RELATED GOALS IN 
ANTITRUST STATUTES 
 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of countries with an antitrust 
law in place in a given year that articulated only Efficiency-
Related goals, only Non-Efficiency-Related Goals, both types of 
goals, or no explicit goals. It reveals that, through 1990, roughly 
70 percent of regimes did not explicitly stipulate any goals. After 
1990, there was an increase in the number of countries that 
explicitly stipulated exclusively Efficiency-Related Goals: by 
2010, 14 percent of countries had goals codified in their antitrust 
statutes that were exclusively Efficiency-Related. However, even 
more countries adopted goals that were not purely related to 
efficiency: by 2010, 16 percent of countries had goals codified in 
their antitrust statutes that were exclusively Non-Efficiency-
Related and 33 percent of countries had goals codified in their 
antitrust statutes that were both Efficiency and Non-Efficiency 
Related. In other words, of the countries that stipulated goals in 
their antitrust statutes, just 22 percent focused exclusively on 
efficiency. Or put another way, contrary to the teachings of the 
Chicago School, 50 percent of countries with antitrust regimes 
had explicitly codified Non-Efficiency-Related Goals in their 
antitrust laws by 2010. 
In addition to rejecting the use of antitrust policy to advance 
goals unrelated to efficiency, the Chicago School unambiguously 
rejected the use of antirust policy for protectionist ends or to 
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advance industrial policy. Of course, countries are unlikely to 
explicitly stipulate that industrial policy is a goal of their 
antitrust law. Instead, if a country is using antitrust policy in 
pursuit of industrial policy, it is more likely to  exempt categories 
of enterprises from the scope of its antitrust regime. 
FIGURE 4: PREVALENCE OF ENTERPRISE EXEMPTIONS IN 
ANTITRUST STATUTES 
 
To test this, Figure 4 reports the proportion of countries with 
an antitrust law in place in a given year that provide complete 
exemptions to certain categories of enterprises.112 Panel A 
specifically breaks out countries that include an explicit 
exemption for state-owned enterprises or state-operated 
enterprises. It makes clear that, while these exemptions are rare, 
they do exist. For instance, by 2010, 7 percent of countries 
included them in their antitrust laws. Panel B breaks out 
countries that have other kinds of enterprise exemptions. These 
include, for example, designated monopolies or export cartels. 
Again, although the majority of countries do not include any of 
these complete exemptions in their antitrust regimes, they have 
remained common. In 1980, they were included in 41 percent of 
countries’ antitrust laws, and by 2010, they were included in 
37 percent of countries’ antitrust laws. In other words, although 
the proportion of countries has slightly decreased since the 
 
 112 Our dataset codes whether countries’ antitrust laws included either complete or 
partial enterprise exemptions. Figure 4, however, only graphs countries with complete 
enterprise exemptions. This is because, depending on the type and their rationale, partial 
exemptions may be consistent with the economic theories advanced by the Chicago School. 
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Chicago School emerged, over a third of countries with antitrust 
regimes have exempted entire categories of enterprises from the 
scope of those laws. 
FIGURE 5: PREVALENCE OF INDUSTRY EXEMPTIONS 
Finally, another way to examine if a country’s antitrust policy 
is used to pursue industrial policy, is to examine if it exempts 
entire industries from the scope of its antitrust laws. Figure 5 
reports the proportion of countries with an antitrust law in place 
in a given year that exempt at least one industry entirely from 
the scope of their laws. Again, this trend has also notably 
increased over time, and the increase has been pronounced in the 
period after the height of the Chicago School in the 1970s. In 
1950, 26 percent of countries had an industry exemption; in 1990, 
49 percent of countries had an industry exemption; and by 2010, 
50 percent of countries exempted at least one industry from their 
antitrust regime. 
C. Unilateral Conduct 
One of the defining features of the Chicago School was its 
skepticism of the need to police unilateral conduct by monopolies. 
By emphasizing the importance of scale economies, the Chicago 
School often viewed large firms as efficient, and argued that such 
firms’ unilateral actions likely improved consumer welfare. As a 
result, antitrust authorities should refrain from challenging 
various types of unilateral conduct that traditional antitrust law 
had condemned as anticompetitive. As Figure 6 shows, however, 
many countries’ antitrust laws continued to directly address a 
range of unilateral conduct. Notably, in 2010, 63 percent of 
countries with antitrust regimes included provisions prohibiting 
unfair pricing while 72 percent prohibited discriminatory pricing. 
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Figure 6 thus suggests that many countries that passed laws 
after the Chicago School’s peak of influence in the United States 
continued to draft laws that prohibited conduct that Chicago 
School scholars argued was unlikely to reduce efficiency. In 
addition, the data shows that only 37 percent of countries allowed 
efficiency defenses in unilateral conduct investigations—a 
Chicago School scholar would argue that efficiency defense should 
be allowed in all unilateral cases. On the other hand, 24 percent 
of countries allowed a public interest defense, something that 
falls clearly outside of the Chicago School framework. 
 
FIGURE 6: PREVALENCE OF PROHIBITIONS ON  
UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
 
Chicago School philosophy would suggest that cartel 
enforcement should be the focus of antitrust policy whereas few 
resources should be dedicated to challenge unilateral conduct. To 
examine whether countries have followed this philosophy, 
Figure 7 compares enforcement activities for both cartel and 
unilateral conduct cases from countries around the world from 
1990 to 2010. Contrary to the Chicago School ideas, Figure 7 
suggests that, around the world between 1990 and 2010, the 
agencies that reported their activities carried out considerably 
more unilateral conduct investigations than cartel investigations. 
For instance, in 2010, there were 1,495 cartel investigations and 
4,128 abuse of dominance investigations around the world. The 
same story emerges for investigations that were actually closed 
with remedies. In 2010, there were 388 cartel investigations that 
were closed with fine or other remedies, which is a small number 
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compared to the 1,617 abuse of dominance investigations that 
were closed with remedies. 
FIGURE 7: COMPARING THE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CARTELS 
AND UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
 
That said, the enforcement data behind Figure 7 have 
limitations. Notably, the total number of investigations and 
remedies are likely undercounted because not all agencies 
reported their data. Moreover, these data count all investigations 
as equal, and thus do not tell us anything about the amount of 
resources that were dedicated to each investigation. For instance, 
it is possible that the unilateral conduct investigations were small 
while the cartel investigations were more substantial. Finally, an 
extremely large percentage of the abuse of dominance 
investigations were initiated by a single country: Russia. In 2010, 
for example, Russia initiated 66 percent of the world’s abuse of 
dominance investigations (2,736 out of 4,128 total). In 2010, 
Russia also was responsible for an astounding 90 percent of the 
world’s abuse of dominance investigations closed with remedies 
(1,453 out of 1,617 total). In comparison, Russia was responsible 
for 41 percent (607 out of 1,495 total) of the world’s cartel 
investigations in 2010, and for 52 percent (393 out of 756 total) of 
the world’s cartel cases closed with remedies in 2009 (Russia did 
not provide data on cartel investigations closed with remedies for 
2010). There are several reasons for Russia’s distinct enforcement 
pattern, including that the Russian agency also uses antitrust 
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law to curb inflation and to control prices.113 Although Russia was 
the world leader of abuse of dominance cases, even excluding 
Russia, the rest of the world still opened more abuse of dominance 
investigations than cartel investigations in 2010. This provides at 
least some evidence that countries have ignored the Chicago 
School teachings according to which unilateral conduct should 
rarely be the focus of antitrust enforcement. 
D. Merger Review 
As previously explained, another area in which the Chicago 
School was critical of existing antitrust doctrine was merger 
review. Indeed, as seen above, Judge Bork scolded the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States114 and 
United States v Von’s Grocery Co,115 and affirmed the primacy of 
allocative efficiency as the core criterion to evaluate a transaction 
amongst two competitors.  
Therefore, another way to indirectly assess the influence of 
the Chicago School is to look at the types of defenses that 
companies can invoke when confronted with a challenge to their 
proposed transaction. The existence of an efficiency defense in a 
jurisdiction recognizes the pro-competitive benefits of mergers, 
and is therefore very much in line with the Chicago School’s 
teachings. The opposite is true if countries allow for other non-
efficiency-related public policy considerations to inform merger 
review. 
Figure 8 graphs the prevalence of merger defenses in 
antitrust regimes around the world from 1950 to 2010. More 
specifically, for countries with an antitrust statute, it shows the 
share of countries that had an efficiency defense, a public interest 
defense, both defenses, or neither defense. Notably, the share of 
countries with explicit defenses in their statutes has increased 
over time. By 2010, only 36 percent of countries had neither 
efficiency nor public interest defenses. Instead, 22 percent of 
countries had only efficiency defenses, 8 percent had only public 
interest defenses, and 34 percent of countries had both efficiency 
and public interest defenses.   Taken together, Figure 8 reveals 
that 42 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had adopted 
merger defenses unrelated to efficiency reasons by 2010—in 
opposition to the Chicago School’s teachings. 
 
 
 113 OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2011 *81 (OECD, Dec 2011), 
archived at https://perma.cc/WF7J-YL23. 
 114 370 US 294 (1962). 
 115 384 US 270 (1966). 
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FIGURE 8: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
MERGER DEFENSES 
CONCLUSION 
Judges Posner and Bork published their treatises more than 
forty years ago, marking one of the high points of decades of 
intellectual work by scholars associated with the University of 
Chicago. Since then, antitrust policy has undergone a revolution: 
US antitrust enforcement changed significantly, reflecting many 
of the teachings of the Chicago School. In the decades that 
followed, antitrust regimes around the world also multiplied. 
However, despite the Chicago School’s vast influence in the 
United States, the evidence we have presented in this Essay 
suggests that the Chicago School’s international penetration was 
less pervasive than many would imagine. 
More recently, as public attention in the United States has 
begun to focus on increased market concentration, lessening 
competition, and rising economic inequality,116 the US Congress 
and enforcement agencies are facing mounting calls to strengthen 
the antitrust laws and their enforcement. Many influential 
scholars are arguing that the United States needs to rethink its 
approach to antitrust policy,117 with some specifically blaming the 
 
 116 See World Economic Outlook: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery *56–58 
(IMF, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/AL4Z-THLV (studying almost one million 
firms to answer questions regarding market power, its effect on income distribution, and 
whether market competition needs to be strengthened). 
 117 See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a 
Competitive Economy 2–7 (Harvard 2019); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. 
Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 
Antitrust L J 669, 669–70 (2017); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, and Glen Weyl, Antitrust 
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Chicago School for providing the intellectual foundation for the 
lax US antitrust enforcement of the past decades.118 While our 
research does not directly address whether the Chicago School 
was too lenient on large corporations, or whether and how US 
antitrust policy should be reformed, our data provides a more 
nuanced view of the Chicago School’s global reach. It also 
suggests that, if the United States wants to reevaluate many of 
the core Chicago School teachings and reinvigorate its antitrust 
enforcement, it has many examples around the world to turn to. 
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